Cato IV
October 11, 1787
To the Citizens of the State of New York,
Admitting, however, that the vast extent of America, together with the variousother reasons which I offered you in my last number, against the practicability of the just exercise of the new government are insufficient to convince you; still it is anundeniable truth, that its several parts are either possessed of principles, which you have heretofore considered as ruinous, and that others are omitted which you have established as fundamental to your political security, and must in their operation. I will venture to assert—fetter your tongues and minds, enchain your bodies, and ultimately extinguish all that is great and noble in man.
In pursuance of my plan, I shall begin with observations on the executive branch of this new system; and though it is not the first in order, as arranged therein, yet being the chief, is perhaps entitled by the rules of rank to the first consideration. The executive power as described in the 2d article, consists of a president and vice-‐president, who are to hold their offices during the term of four years; the same article has marked the manner and time of their election, and established the qualifications of the president; it also provides against the removal, death, or inability of the president and vice-‐president—regulates the salary of the president, delineates his duties and powers; and lastly, declares the causes for which the president and vice-‐president shall be removed from office.
Notwithstanding the great learning and abilities of the gentlemen who composedthe convention, it may be here remarked with deference, that the construction of thefirst paragraph of the first section of the second article, is vague and inexplicit, andleaves the mind in doubt, as to the election of a president and vice-‐president, after theexpiration of the election for the first term of four years—in every other case, the election of these great officers is expressly provided for; but there is no explicitprovision for their election in case of the expiration of their offices, subsequent to theelection which is to set this political machine in motion—no certain and express termsas in your state constitution, that statedly once in every four years, and as often asthese offices shall become vacant, by expiration or otherwise, as is therein expressed,an election shall be held as follows, &c.—this inexplicitness perhaps may lead to anestablishment for life.
It is remarked by Montesquieu, in treating of republics, that in all magistracies, thegreatness of the power must be compensated by the brevity of the duration; and that alonger time than a year, would be dangerous. It is therefore obvious to the leastintelligent mind, to account why, great power in the hands of a magistrate, and thatpower connected, with a considerable duration, may be dangerous to the liberties of arepublic—the deposit of vast trusts in the hands of a single magistrate, enables him intheir exercise, to create a numerous train of dependants—this tempts his ambition,which in a republican magistrate is also remarked, to be pernicious and the duration ofhis office for any considerable time favours his views, gives him the means and time toperfect and execute his designs—he therefore fancies that he may be great and gloriousby oppressing his fellow citizens, and raising himself to permanent grandeur on the ruinsof his country.—And here it may be necessary to compare the vast and importantpowers of the president, together with his continuance in office with the foregoingdoctrine—his eminent magisterial situation will attach many adherents to him, and hewill be surrounded by expectants and courtiers—his power of nomination and influenceon all appointments—the strong posts in each state comprised within hissuperintendance, and garrisoned by troops under his direction—his controul over thearmy, militia, and navy—the unrestrained power of granting pardons for treason, whichmay be used to screen from punishment, those whom he had secretly instigated tocommit the crime, and thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt—his duration inoffice for four years: these, and various other principles evidently prove the truth of theposition—that if the president is possessed of ambition, he has power and timesufficient to ruin his country.
Though the president, during the sitting of the legislature, is assisted by the senate,yet he is without a constitutional council in their recess—he will therefore beunsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be directed byminions and favorites, or a council of state will grow out of the principal officers of thegreat departments, the most dangerous council in a free country.
The ten miles square, which is to become the seat of government, will of course bethe place of residence for the president and the great officers of state—the sameobservations of a great man will apply to the court of a president possessing the powersof a monarch, that is observed of that of a monarch—ambition with idleness—basenesswith pride—the thirst of riches without labour—aversion to truth—flattery—treason—perfidy—violation of engagements—contempt of civil duties—hope from themagistrates weakness; but above all, the perpetual ridicule of virtue—these, he remarks,are the characteristics by which the courts in all ages have been distinguished.
The language and the manners of this court will be what distinguishes them fromthe rest of the community, not what assimilates them to it, and in being remarked for abehaviour that shews they are not meanly born, and in adulation to people of fortuneand power.
The establishment of a vice president is as unnecessary as it is dangerous. Thisofficer, for want of other employment, is made president of the senate, therebyblending the executive and legislative powers, besides always giving to some one state,from which he is to come, an unjust pre-‐eminence.
It is a maxim in republics, that the representative of the people should be of theirimmediate choice; but by the manner in which the president is chosen he arrives to thisoffice at the fourth or fifth hand, nor does the highest votes, in the way he is elected,determine the choice—for it is only necessary that he should be taken from the highestof five, who may have a plurality of votes.
Compare your past opinions and sentiments with the present proposedestablishment, and you will find, that if you adopt it, that it will lead you into a systemwhich you heretofore reprobated as odious. Every American whig, not long since, borehis emphatic testimony against a monarchical government, though limited, because ofthe dangerous inequality that it created among citizens as relative to their rights andproperty; and wherein does this president, invested with his powers and prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great-‐Britain (save as to name, the creation of nobilityand some immaterial incidents, the offspring of absurdity and locality) the direct prerogatives of the president, as springing from his political character, are among thefollowing:—It is necessary, in order to distinguish him from the rest of the community, and enable him to keep, and maintain his court, that the compensation for his services;or in other words, his revenue should be such as to enable him to appear with thesplendor of a prince; he has the power of receiving ambassadors from, and a greatinfluence on their appointments to foreign courts; as also to make treaties, leagues, andalliances with foreign states, assisted by the senate, which when made, become thesupreme law of the land: he is a constituent part of the legislative power; for every billwhich shall pass the house of representatives and senate, is to be presented to him forapprobation; if he approves of it, he is to sign it, if he disapproves, he is to return it withobjections, which in many cases will amount to a compleat negative; and in this view hewill have a great share in the power of making peace, coining money, &c. and all thevarious objects of legislation, expressed or implied in this Constitution: for though it maybe asserted that the king of Great-‐Britain has the express power of making peace orwar, yet he never thinks it prudent so to do without the advice of his parliament fromwhom he is to derive his support, and therefore these powers, in both president andking, are substantially the same: he is the generalissimo of the nation, and of course, hasthe command & controul of the army, navy and militia; he is the general conservator ofthe peace of the union—he may pardon all offences, except in cases of impeachment,and the principal fountain of all offices & employments. Will not the exercise of thesepowers therefore tend either to the establishment of a vile and arbitrary aristocracy, ormonarchy? The safety of the people in a republic depends on the share or proportionthey have in the government; but experience ought to teach you, that when a man is atthe head of an elective government invested with great powers, and interested in his re-‐election, in what circle appointments will be made; by which means an imperfectaristocracy bordering on monarchy may be established.
You must, however, my countrymen, beware, that the advocates of this newsystem do not deceive you, by a fallacious resemblance between it and your own state government, which you so much prize; and if you examine, you will perceive that thechief magistrate of this state, is your immediate choice, controuled and checked by ajust and full representation of the people, divested of the prerogative of influencing warand peace, making treaties, receiving and sending embassies, and commanding standingarmies and navies, which belong to the power of the confederation, and will beconvinced that this government is no more like a true picture of your own, than anAngel of darkness resembles an Angel of light.